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Abstract
This essay continues a project begun a decade ago with the article, “A Matter of Life and Debt: The 
Untold Costs of Rafiq Hariri’s New Beirut.” This new article, or “Postscript,” begins by examining 
the reception of that first investigation and responds to one criticism directed at the original essay: 
that it proffers an unfairly pessimistic profile of the reconstruction effort generally and of its prime 
mover specifically, the now-deceased Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. This paper follows a cost/benefits 
analysis of the project and the company behind it, Solidere, and examines two other Solidere-styled 
developments abroad, both results of the company’s attempts to monetize its so-called “brand.” 
The first of these, “Abdali,” is in Amman. The second of these comprises a trio of projects that SI 
prepared for Sheikh Zayed City in metropolitan Cairo. The paper argues that Solidere’s failure 
to disclose the dubious financial dealings behind such projects further erodes the credibility of a 
company for whom the notion of “business as usual” works first and foremost to benefit the few at 
the expense of the many.
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Update
This article moves forward an essay written in the year 2000, “A Matter of Life 
and Debt: The Untold Costs of Rafiq Hariri’s New Beirut.”1 It began life as 
a meditation on the extensive reconstruction of the city following Lebanon’s 
catastrophic civil war. The mammoth effort was epitomized by Beirut’s land-
mark center-city project, known by the marketing acronym SOLIDERE, 
whose 1994 incorporation ushered in a period of national enthusiasm, mil-
lenial in zeal. As argued in the original essay, Solidere, more than any other 
single postwar project, was the capstone of then Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri’s 
economic vision for the nation and its capital. The media blitz surrounding 
the project was pervasive and inescapable at the time: the author was made to 
understand, by corporate insiders no less, that this place’s economic success 
was inextricably tied to the country’s future. Yet, despite the noisy claims 
(or perhaps because of them), there was the uncanny sense that something 
was definitely amiss here. Maybe it was the increasingly hollow sound of the 
rhetoric or the dissonant note in the fanfare that stirred misgivings. However 
much Solidere’s press releases infused quotable, feel-good copy into the story 
that the company told, the wordless, almost surreal emptiness of the place 
communicated something else entirely. How was it that so expensive and 
ambitious an urban reconstruction, a project so fraught with a nation’s best 
hopes for itself, how was it that this place could remain so devoid of its people 
(see Figure 1)?2 The author’s misgivings, the observations that sustained them 
and tentative conclusions that issued from them gave shape to that essay. Its 
publication in 2005 was met immediately with a favorable reception. 
Since “A Matter of Life and Debt” first appeared, it has been cited dozens 
of times in books and refereed journal articles whose wide-ranging subject 
matter includes architecture, urban planning, heritage preservation, econom-
ics, sociology, politics, public policy and queer theory. The essay has found 
its way into courses and theses undertaken in distinguished universities inter-
nationally. It has also shown up in less familiar settings, like the website of 
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the fabled St. Georges Hotel, whose owners have excerpted it on their banner 
page to draw public attention to Solidere’s strong-arm business tactics and 
its dubious designs on their property.3 Given the article’s wide currency, it 
would seem that “A Matter of Life and Debt” has acquired a life of its own, 
having insinuated itself into modern Beirut’s required reading, especially for 
those interested in the causes and effects of its complex urban phenomenology. 
Furthermore, it has been especially gratifying to observe that the questions 
raised there a decade ago are now being asked of kindred urban developments 
in the region – Amman, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Jeddah, and Dubai included. 
Its current popularity notwithstanding, the article has also found its 
detractors. Most notably, Mark Neal and Richard Tansey, the co-authors of 
“Effective Corrupt Political Leadership in Lebanon”,4 have faulted the work 
for its overly harsh appraisal of the economic policies of Rafiq Hariri. As a 
response to the 2001 position outlined in the paper, they have applied a positive 
spin to the notion of political corruption as they describe a viable management 
mode called “effective corrupt political leadership” that applies particularly to 
the Middle East, and specifically to the deceased Prime Minister. They argue 
that his political conduct is rooted in the centuries-old tradition relating the 
overlord, or “za’im,” to his clientele or “zilm,” via a systematic exchange of 
favors for political party loyalty, “wasta” that is, and the blessings that accrue 
Figure 1. Maarad Street, Place de l’Etoile, Beirut. Photo courtesy of 
Al-Jazeera Digital Magazine, 12 January 2014
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to it. An economy of indebtedness, at once material and psychic, connects one 
to the other, cementing an interpersonal mutuality that endures. In defense, 
this particularly resilient variety of political opportunism was actually taken to 
task in the original article. In fact, an understanding of clientelism is central to 
the considerations of “debt” and “indebtedness” there.
In contrast to the work criticized by Neal and Tansey, their approach to 
Rafiq Hariri’s political career outlines a broadly based rationale by which 
they effectively suspend disbelief in the potentially corrosive effects of nepo-
tism on government and corporate management structures.5 As they lay 
out conditions under which state-supported corruption can be rationalized, 
they take critics of the system to task, questioning their ethical intent as they 
accuse them of party-motivated bias fueled by a countervailing self-interest.6 
However, the lingering and most problematical effect of the authors’ endorse-
ment of “effective corrupt political leadership,” at least insofar as Rafiq 
Hariri is concerned, is the degree to which it confers a perverse legitimacy 
to the sub-rosa operation of undisclosed, special interests (per the clientelist 
system), while it undermines fiduciary responsibility and transparent business 
practices. So long as the benefits outweigh the liabilities, corporate or govern-
ment, Neal and Tansey would argue that corruption is admissible, especially 
in places where patronage ties are programmed into the operating system.
Decidedly Ineffective Corrupt Corporate Governance
It is impossible to understand Neal and Tansey’s largely upbeat appraisal of 
Hariri’s “effective leadership” without the extraordinary performance of the 
Lebanese economy circa 2008 in its back story. Solidere directly benefited 
from the country’s economic boom that arrived when the Doha Accord 
quieted Lebanon’s post-Hariri interconfessional discord and sounded an 
“all clear” to the country’s financial markets. For the following three years, 
Lebanese banks profited from a cataract of foreign direct investment as the 
huge Lebanese diaspora repatriated its foreign capital back home in the wake 
of the 2007 US financial meltdown. One effect of the newfound liquidity: 
Solidere’s 2008 Class A shares reached an all-time high of $37, an increase of 
almost 400% over its 1994 IPO, enviable stock performance by any measure, 
Lebanese or otherwise.
This infusion of capital compounded the already high inflows of Gulf 
direct investment that commenced in April 2001 when the Lebanese govern-
ment approved Law 296 legalizing the ownership of Lebanese property by 
non-nationals.7 Between 2001 and 2011, capital investment in Lebanese real 
estate by the MENA marketplace accelerated, driving up real estate prices 
in Lebanon’s most desirable areas, among them, Solidere. Courting wealthy 
Arab investors from the outset, the project’s designers inflated the size 
and layouts of its typical rental housing units. As one-time renters became 
property owners after 2001, the percentage of property owned in the Beruit 
Central District (BCD) by foreigners grew to almost 10%. In the meantime, 
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Lebanese investors lacking in petrodollars were forced to content themselves 
with Solidere’s more modest housing stock, tending away from seafront units 
toward less expensive ones in Solidere’s Saifi Village, Martyr’s Square, and 
Mina El-Hosn. More typically though, they took their business elsewhere. Is 
it any wonder, then, that so many Lebanese today have such difficulty identi-
fying with the rebuilt BCD? 
Solidere’s 2008 annual report lends credible support to the economic 
growth of the time by its healthy numbers: Assets totaling $2,453,832,477 
and Liabilities of $594,167,858. The debt to equity ratio is a not-insignificant 
30%, sizeable but less than that of many comparable enterprises in the 
MENA region.8 
Solidere’s most recent annual report, FY 2014, tells a less upbeat story, 
however.9 Between FY 2008 and 2013, revenues from real estate fell from 
$256, 635, 633 to $169,473,806, a decline of some 34%. Profits too declined 
significantly as Solidere’s dividend was cut from $1.00 in 2008 to $.10/share 
in 2014, which is, incidentally, a modest uptick following upon the dividend’s 
suspension in FY2013.10 Lastly, forward-looking stock price projections have 
become increasingly pessimistic since 2011. To illustrate, in November 2014, 
Banque Libanaise d’Outre Mer [BLOM], issued a forward-looking net asset 
value of $13.50/share, down significantly from the $20 it projected in early 
2013.11 Meanwhile the stock has hovered in the $10–12 range for the past two 
years, significantly below the level of stock analysts’ lowered expectations. 
The Lebanese boom years occasioned by the global financial crisis ended 
abruptly in 2011 with the Arab Spring. Financial markets roiled as countries 
across the region – Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, and Syria among them –  confronted 
their political leadership with longstanding political grievances. Despotic 
leaders deemed corrupt were popularly overthrown in three of these. However, 
Syria’s version of the Arab Spring has resulted in the deep retrenchment of 
leader Bashar Al-Assad in a politically unstable stalemate that has driven as 
many as 1.5 million political refugees into Lebanon. Today the country bears 
the lion’s share of the costs of housing and provisioning a refugee population 
one-third the size of the country itself. Incursions by a caliphate-obsessed ISIS 
and Al-Qaeda-backed Jabhat el Nusra into northeastern Lebanon, though 
successfully thwarted by the Lebanese Army, cause many today to wonder if 
the Syrian Civil War will overflow its borders. And although the diaspora’s 
direct investment into Lebanon’s banks continues, suffice it to say that few 
MENA investors are prepared to risk major financial commitment in Lebanon 
these days. And Solidere’s annual reports since 2011 have testified to this fact.
2014 saw Solidere’s share price dip below its $10 par value. In doing so, the 
company’s price to book value fell to. 97, which is to say that the “efficient 
market” values the net worth of all the company’s physical assets at a level 
lower than the company’s initial capitalization, $1,650,000,000. Solidere’s 
most recent annual report reinforces this grim technical appraisal. While the 
company lists Assets of $2,964,086,442 for FY 2014, it also reports Liabilities 
of $899,494,384. Its debt to equity ratio has swollen to 54%, while the dollar 
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amount has also grown by more than 50% since 2008. Given the fact that the 
Solidere’s 1994 Covenants of Incorporation originally set the Debt/Equity 
ratio at 20%, it appears that the company has taken on a debt level that sig-
nificantly exceeds the limits originally deemed healthy – or lawful – for it.12
Truth be told, the financial picture may actually be worse than these 
numbers suggest. First, we must realize that Solidere’s assets are inflated 
by revenues attached to a group of semi-autonomous, spun-off compa-
nies founded in 2007 and designed to diversify its revenue stream: BCD 
Services, Beirut Waterfront, Real Estate Management, ASB Downtown, and 
Solidere International (SI). A sixth member of the group, Beirut Hospitality, 
failed financially in 2010. SI involves a capital investment from the parent 
company of almost $343 million. Its generated revenues, though noted 
and factored into the annual report, essentially bypass Solidere proper, 
as they are returned to the company’s home in Dubai for new real estate 
projects outside of Lebanon. The spinoff company’s dubious track record 
will be touched upon at a later point in this discussion. Other companies in 
the group, Beirut Waterfront and BCD Services are losing money per the 
2014 Annual Report.
Second, the Company’s assets have been inflated by what should be seen 
as a potentially risky line item: Receivables. While it is standard accounting 
practice to enter Accounts Receivable into a company’s assets, it is important 
to bear in mind that this line item brings with it some illiquidity and atten-
dant risk. In fact, Receivables should be construed as promissory notes for 
payment on real estate contracts made within the fiscal year. In Solidere’s 
case, they amount to short-term debt obligations effectively underwritten and 
held virtually interest-free by the company. In a disturbing sidebar to this 
discussion, the 2014 annual report indicates that fully 91% of the obligations 
attached to three customers – 100 million dollars worth – had to be restruc-
tured if these short-term financial obligations were to be settled in a timely 
manner, if indeed they were to be met at all.13 And some of this bad debt 
appears as a line item, indicated as a 2013 Liabilities write-off in the amount 
of $16,042,021, and, in 2014, a write-off of $7,459,230.14 
Since 2008, Solidere has more than doubled the amount of its Accounts 
Receivable, growing them from $246,401,913 to $552,290,794 in 2014. 
Meanwhile, it has more than tripled the amount of its 2008 Bank Overdraft 
costs, ballooning from $176,496,835 to $548,575,050 in 2014. The rise in 
overdraft fees points to one thing: Solidere is suffering from liquidity prob-
lems stemming to some significant degree from the poor performance of its 
Receivables portfolio. To cover the ongoing costs of operations, Solidere is 
forced both to sell assets (drawing down its own investment portfolio and 
tapping into its mandated cash reserves), and to rely on added debt, as it 
borrows increasing amounts on the short- and medium-term debt markets at 
interest rates from 1.5 to 5% to stay afloat.
Solidere has also been forced to deal with its skyrocketing debt load 
by reducing costs. First, it has economized by cutting both operating and 
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capital expenditures. As far as OPEX is concerned, the company has made 
significant reductions in personnel, laying off dozens of its middle-level 
management, thus adding to the country’s 20% unemployment rate.15 
Many patronage hires have also been terminated, politically well-connected 
personnel who, according to Solidere Chair, Nasser Chammaa, “were 
forced on us based on requests from MPs, ministers, and political leaders, 
and who are a burden on the company.”16 Clearly, all is not well at Camelot’s 
Round Table.17
Meanwhile, and without skipping a beat, the company has announced 
pay raises of 75% (from a payroll of $2,960,352 in 2013 to $4,696,505 in 
2014) to everyone on its board and senior management, presumably for 
their effectiveness in reducing overhead. Regarding CAPEX, Solidere has 
suspended capital-intensive construction. including sewerage and port infra-
structure projects, thereby avoiding new long-term financing for the near 
term at least.
Second, Solidere is seeking to recapitalize its cash position by issuing three 
tranches of real estate-backed securities to the tune of $180,000,000. These 
securities carry a 5% coupon; to date research has not revealed a bond rating 
for them. The purpose of these securities is to liquidate a portion of the com-
pany’s Receivables portfolio, assumedly a problematical part of it.18 It can be 
safely assumed that Lebanon’s banks will purchase the lion’s share of these 
offerings, especially since Lebanon’s Central Bank has recently injected into 
the commercial banking sector some $1.6 billion dollars earmarked for such 
purposes.19 Offered at a 1% interest rate, these loans are designed to directly 
stimulate the Lebanese real estate market. Meanwhile bond spreads guaran-
tee the banks an automatic 4% profit on these transactions. On the sellers’ 
side, Solidere directly benefits from significant inflows of capital for the near 
term at least, issuing from the banking sector’s three-year long subscription 
to its securities. Even more importantly, the company has finagled a way to 
reduce the riskiness of its Accounts Receivable, as it bundles a significant 
portion of its outstanding real estate contracts, both good and bad, into these 
securities offerings. The surety of these securities, however, is anyone’s guess. 
Even more disturbing is the likelihood of these shares being rebundled into 
tranches of other asset-backed Lebanese bank issues, and the potential for 
Solidere’s defaulting contracts to infect a far larger portion of the country’s 
fixed income financial market. 
As it turns out, the very same investors who have watched their portfolios 
of Solidere A shares dwindle over the past six years are again being targeted 
by the company and its proxies via these new investment vehicles. Money 
raised this time around, however, will go not to capitalize the company and 
its business ventures for organic profit growth but to underwrite the very 
debt that has so vitiated investors’ equity stakes in the company. The ironies 
notwithstanding, the bet that bondholders take on company debt may be the 
best hope to date for investors near-term to walk away from Solidere with 
something to show for the financial risks they have taken here.
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Brand Spanking
The ironies, however, compound when we turn to Solidere’s portfolio of 
spinoff developments. The first of these was Amman’s Abdali, an urban 
renewal project issuing from a business plan drafted by Lebanon’s Rafiq 
Hariri and Jordan’s King Abdullah II in 2002.20 Unlike Beirut, which chose 
to rebuild on the ruins of the old BCD, Amman would recenter the city in a 
vast, new development on the city’s affluent, west side. 
Hariri was nothing if not a canny businessman. He observed firsthand the 
flow of new capital redirected into the Arab real estate sector following 9/11, 
watching it inflate Solidere’s revenue stream and float its stock price. He also 
intuited the critical role that Jordan would play in any plan the US might 
hatch against the mistakenly presumed mastermind of 9/11, Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein, and he could see a cash windfall on the horizon for the Jordanian 
economy. The new project – a veritable ‘new downtown’ – would issue from a 
partnership between Hariri and Abdullah. 
For his part of the investment, King Abdullah would turn to his army, his tra-
ditional locus of political power, to provide the new development’s land equity. 
Meanwhile, Hariri would bring the brand and the money. Together, Solidere’s 
contractor OGER and the army’s development arm – code name MAWARED 
(English translation: ASSETS) – would draw up plans for a mixed-use devel-
opment involving a surface area of some 447,000 square meters and a budget 
of three billion dollars. The capital would come from a stock subscription in 
the new Abdali Investment and Development Company [AID] having three 
major shareholders – the army with 43.5% of the stock, Hariri, with 43.5%, 
and an unnamed Kuwaiti investor with 13%. Following Rafiq Hariri’s 2005 
assassination, the project proceeded under the direction of his children, most 
importantly, the eldest son Bahaa, who soon replaced the family’s contracting 
arm, Saudi-OGER, with his own Monaco-based company, Horizon.
Marketed, like Solidere, as a public/private partnership, the company has 
presented itself as steward of Jordan’s national self-interest and guarantor of 
public well-being. So tightly bound are they that the complex’s moniker actu-
ally derives from the King’s own given name. Despite such strong political ties 
(or perhaps because of them), the project’s public commitment is nonetheless 
open to dispute. The fact of the matter is that, given its limited cash position, 
Jordan could contribute only land assets to the project, specifically, the equity 
accruing to the publicly owned, army property in the center of Amman. The 
real money, however, came from the venture’s stock subscribers, and it is their 
fiduciary interests first and foremost that the company takes care to protect. As 
for the public – the citizens of Amman, that is – those unlucky enough to own 
property around the army base suffered its seizure by the government thanks to 
the company’s extraordinary powers of eminent domain. Shades of Solidere. 
Meanwhile, the “public” that Abdali solicits are the camp followers of profit-
able speculation – a skilled and comparatively affluent managerial class, that 
is – an elite cadre guaranteed to grow as a cavalcade of international business 
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partners seize the business opportunities to be found in this new Amman (see 
Figure 2). The “public” whose interests are to be protected here would be those 
educated, discerning, and affluent enough to direct their discretionary money 
to the development’s trendy shops, dine in its rooftop restaurants, and exer-
cise in its health clubs, and that is to say, a public quite different from the one 
we normally associate with Jordan. This “public” is something distinct from 
the local population, largely discouraged from making their presence known 
here. And, at the odd moments that a pre-modern Jordan makes itself felt, as 
it does in the Boulevard-promoted 2015 Jordanian Cultural Festival shown in 
Figure 3, it is contrived as “local color” almost anthropologically constructed, 
its obvious Orientalism at odds with the place’s bland urbanity.
In June 2014, Bahaa Hariri cut the ribbon to the centerpiece of the new 
Solidere-inspired complex, its blunt-nosed skyscrapers standing like huge 
quotation marks at either end of Boulevard, an assembly line of silvery, 
midrise, mixed-use blocks parked beside a coordinated, pedestrian prom-
enade. To me, it harkens back to Linord, Lebanon’s long-stalled,1990s-era 
 megastructure on the coast north of Beirut with impeccable modernist pedi-
gree.21 This time, though, the spare geometry of that early project has been 
grafted onto the western edge of Amman’s inner city, where it is imagined as 
a generative set piece, conjuring up, per the project’s promotional literature, 
Paris’s Champs-Elysees, Barcelona’s Ramblas, and London’s Oxford Street. 
While long on upbeat PR, the place we encounter today is unfortunately 
short on memorable experience. Despite its illustrious urban ancestry, as a 
city attraction Abdali’s Boulevard has been judged decidedly short on allure. 
Figure 2. Daytime view of The Boulevard, Abdali, Amman, Jordan. Photo by Ziad I. 
at Foursquare.com. https://foursquare.com/v/the-boulevard/50dfe7b6e4b0929c2252f
07b/photos?openPhotoId=5356a974498eaf58f90069a7
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Figure 3. Artisanal installation at the 2015 Jordanian Cultural Festival 
on The Boulevard, Abdali. http://www.abdali.jo/index.php?r=media
More importantly, it has shown itself decidedly short on foot traffic – people, 
that is – probably because Boulevard’s rental space has failed to attract 
tenants in the critical numbers that it had hoped. When Bahaa Hariri opened 
the doors to the complex’s promenade, Boulevard’s ground-level shops were 
only 30% occupied (see Figure 4).22 
Whatever its successes and failures, as the first of Beirut’s progeny, 
Amman’s Boulevard has fundamentally shaped what Nasser Chammaa has 
coined and marketed as “the Solidere brand.”23 Glittery as a Caddy show-
room, Boulevard is a throwback to the economic optimism that revved up 
the Middle Eastern economy post-9/11 and ultimately prompted the launch 
of SI from the mother ship. These days, however, the project’s jetsetter 
solicitations strike one as so much architectural hyperbole, simultaneously 
outdated and out of touch, especially given the intractable political realities 
that have occasioned Amman’s new UN Refugee Headquarters just around 
the corner, and cash-poor refugee camps bursting with Syrian exiles not far 
away. One wonders about the market for the luxury office space and accom-
modations the project serves up.24 Be honest: Would you be prepared to sink 
good money into an address, albeit a glamorous one, within shooting distance 
of a Civil War?25
No country has invested more in the success of SI than Egypt, whose largest 
investment bank, Hermes, managed the spinoff’s $770 million dollar Dubai 
IPO in 2006. Given the bank’s considerable stake in the company, it should 
10 ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY  Vol. 10 No. 1  September 2016
Amps
come as no surprise that SI would figure significantly in two of the huge real 
estate investments Hermes has helped to bankroll near Cairo, under construc-
tion since the 1990s. Eventually, New Cairo on the Suez Road to the east, and 
Sixth of October/Sheikh-Zayed on the Alexandria Road to the west will house, 
by one accounting, five million people.26 Since groundbreaking, these suburbs 
have been envisioned as premium and exclusive residential locations, targeting 
the city’s administrative class and its moneyed professional and entrepreneur-
ial elite.27 With the arrival of SI to the new suburbs came the “Solidere brand” 
and intangible value added to the property mix via two lifestyle offerings – 
Cairo Eastown and Westown. The builders – real estate development company 
SODIC – feel that the label brings to these particular projects distinctive archi-
tectural cachet, and they say so in their marketing materials. Further value is 
added, per the PR, by the design contributions of an international bevy of star 
architects who enhance Solidere’s own design efforts.28
The projects’ promotional materials look familiar, probably because they 
come from Solidere’s Services arm. Its brochures regale us with digital ren-
derings of the projects’ open spaces photoshopped to overflowing with happy 
diners, browsers, joggers, and bikers, who collectively promote a new and 
distinctly Westernized kind of distracted, consumer-driven, urban living 
(see Figure 5). As for the intangibles, the brochures fill in those blanks as well. 
Figure 4. Abdali’s Boulevard with empty shops disguised by billboards and street art 
at Ramadan, June 2015. Photo by Luma K. at Foursquare.com. https://foursquare.
com/v/the-boulevard/50dfe7b6e4b0929c2252f07b
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Figure 5. Dining in The Hub, Westown, Sixth October/Sheikh Zayed City, 
Cairo. Photo courtesy of Westown online brochure. http://sodic.com/
media-downloads/#development-projects/39
Where images fail to tell the story, Westown’s press copy takes over, instruct-
ing us as to how best appreciate these places while leaving no doubt as to 
the advantages of living there. Forty West, designed by Boston’s Machado/
Silvetti architects, has three distinct complements of trendy housing. One 
of these, “Urban Chic,” is described as a “true urban neighborhood with a 
wide range of stunning apartments, world-class restaurants, cafes, shops” 
(see Figure 6).29 Its units are “… classy, artistic, daring. Urban Chic is 
inspired by the loft living of New York and London. It’s a sophisticated style 
for fashionable people who know what they want. The perfect environment 
for art books, freshly ground coffee, and dinner parties that last well into the 
night.”30 But, what if you don’t like coffee … ?
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Make no doubt about it, a residence here is not just a piece of property, 
but a serious lifestyle commitment, a rite of passage garnering membership 
into an exclusive preserve, equal parts country club and town meeting, less 
Cairoene, or even Egyptian, than cosmopolite.31 And if it all sounds rather 
like social engineering, well, it is. “We don’t want downtown culture trans-
planted here, the swearing, the noise … We’re trying to create the right 
society,”32 so says Youasef Hamad, SODIC’s chief commercial officer. 
Keeping all this “rightness” on the straight and narrow, however, demands 
a mindful eye and oversight … surveillance, that is. To guarantee these com-
munities’ social homogeneity (and their bloodlines?), Cairo’s new suburbs 
are typically gated. And where they are not, “…don’t worry. Security will be 
at every entrance ensuring only the right people get in.”33 One resident, in an 
unguarded moment, was more direct about why she lives in a place like this. 
“When these people rise up”, at least she won’t be in the front lines.34
Solidere’s entry into the Cairo real estate glitterati occurred in the days 
immediately preceding the 2006 formation of SI. Clearly, Eastown and 
Westown were in play even then, as SODIC envisioned new, high-profile 
“hubs” for their projects in Sixth of October/Sheikh Zayed City and New 
Cairo designed by Solidere. However, it took events arising out of the popular 
protests of January 2011 to bring the true nature of Solidere’s  relationship 
with SODIC to light. In capsule form, this is the story. In the 1970s Anwar 
Sadat’s government made the decision to develop the desert areas east and 
west of Cairo – Ketameyah and Sixth of October – as industrial zones suitable 
for expanding the country’s industrial sector and housing its workers.
Sixth of October was founded by the New Communities Authority in 1977 
while New Cairo/Ketameyah dates from the early 1980s, and both are among 
Figure 6. Forty West’s “Urban Chic.” “Urban Chic”. Photo courtesy of 
Forty West Interiors brochure. http://www.slideshare.net/zayedhome/
forty-west-interiors-brochure
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the nation’s earliest new towns. In the 1990s, however, one particularly 
intrepid developer made the decision to rethink this strategy as he introduced 
into New Cairo a luxury housing neighborhood named Ketameyah Heights, 
outfitted with a golf course surrounded by huge detached villas embellished 
with US-style lawns, barbeque grills, and swimming pools.35 Its success was 
sensational. The profit margins at this enterprise were enormous, especially 
given the almost non-existent cost of the land, so much so it caused most 
others to rethink their market strategies there.
As the government controlled the development land bank of the develop-
ers – although desert, it was, after all, national land – Hosni Mubarak and 
his government stood to make the most from the total makeover.36 Cairo’s 
previously unbuildable arid terrain was doled out piece by piece without 
competitive bids as various government actors accepted bribes to guarantee 
government good will, along with a chunk of the ensuing financial action 
(see Figure 7). The post-Mubarak interim government and then Mohammed 
Morsi’s took aim at the purported graft surrounding Egypt’s real estate 
sector. Years of court hearings provided ample evidence of what Egyptians 
had long suspected: that vast parcels of the country’s public lands had been 
sold for next to nothing and that their kickback proceeds, such as they were, 
had been pocketed by government officials. What’s more, the hearings also 
revealed that the Egyptian treasury had paid for the critical infrastructure – 
including roads, power, sewerage – in private development projects whose 
huge profits would never remit to the nation that financed them.37
The growing scandal expanded outward from the government’s leader-
ship into its ministries and their agencies. Ultimately, the criminal investiga-
tion homed in on the New Communities Authority (NCA), a spinoff of the 
Ministry of Habitat, Utilities, and New Communities run at the turn of this 
century by Ibrahim Suleiman.38 Among its other responsibilities, NCA con-
trolled the Egyptian Arab Land Bank whose assets it doled out to a group 
of Mubarak confederates.39 Meanwhile, the government probe embroiled 
Egypt’s private sector, involving virtually every major name tied to Egypt’s 
Figure 7. Allegria development, Sixth of October, showing desert proximity. 
Photographer: Natalia Echeverri. Photo courtesy of “Cairo: Suburbanizing 
the Desert” in Polis: A Collaborative Blog about Cities of the World”, 22 
October 2009. http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_2wBh8QfqZUA/St_w_2gaYKI/
AAAAAAAAAIA/PqTaSvXbYxk/s1600-h/a-suburbdesert.JPG 
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construction industry, from building material suppliers, to contractors, to 
marketing firms.
The patronage pyramid that the state tribunal has exposed goes something 
like this.40 At the top is Hosni Mubarak and his two sons, Gamal, the heir-
apparent, and the real estate magnate, Alaa. All three have been indicted by 
the court for their illegal dealings in state land and subsequently found guilty 
of land fraud.41 Next in the chain of command comes Ibrahim Suleiman, the 
keeper of the Land Bank, as well as Alaa Mubarak’s father-in-law, Magdi 
Razekh, former Chairman of SODIC, who resigned in May 2011 only to flee 
the country. Believed to be hiding in Spain, Razekh has been tried in absentia 
and found guilty of graft as he profited from the unauthorized sale of land 
transferred to him by Suleiman to the tune of 28 million dollars. For their 
parts in the fraud, both have been sentenced to five years in prison and fined 
165 million dollars.42 Under the al-Sisi regime, however, charges of criminal 
fraud against both Suleiman and Razekh have been conditionally dismissed. 
And the condition of its clemency? Each must now reimburse the state the dis-
counted sum of $85 million, a “fee” based on the current, fair market value of 
the properties in question, parcels of which Razekh channeled to some of the 
region’s largest developers.43 The list comprises a veritable Middle Eastern 
Who’s Who, whose tally even includes Saudi Arabia’s Prince Alwaleed Bin 
Talal as well as a number of Solidere associates.44 
The next step down the pyramid brings us to the developers themselves, 
among them SODIC and its Lebanese affiliate, Solidere International. The 
business relationship established between Solidere and SODIC guaranteed 
the Beirut company a continuous revenue stream – “carried interest,” so it is 
called – amounting to 7–10% of the market value added to the property above 
cost, the premium added by attaching SI’s brand to a set of exclusive SODIC 
properties.45 The new market value would be recalculated annually, and SI’s 
share set accordingly. Revenues might also eventually accrue to the properties 
that Solidere optioned at an advantageous, preset price set by SODIC.
For the first two years, the marriage between SI and SODIC was a love fest. 
By 2009, however, the happy hookup started showing cracks in the veneer. The 
late-2007 sub-prime mortgage meltdown that triggered the Great Recession 
moved like a tsunami through world markets. In the MENA region, Cairo’s 
new suburbs were particularly hard hit. Unit sales there collapsed, and with 
this shortfall, the company’s revenue stream tanked. Around that time, 
SODIC peremptorily discontinued its use of Solidere Services to develop two 
of its three properties in Westown, the Strip and the Western Hub specifically. 
With the fall in SODIC revenues came, not surprisingly, a growing problem 
with Solidere’s Accounts Receivable, and liquidity problems that led to a 
lawsuit against its partner in 2012 for unpaid debts.46 SODIC met that lawsuit 
with one of its own, accusing Solidere of failing to produce a development 
plan for one of its Westown sites, and non-compliance with the terms of the 
partnership’s original partnership agreement.47 Shortly thereafter, Solidere 
made an extraordinary, one-time, $12.8 million dollar (EP160 million) 
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payment to SODIC that was NOT a settlement, so the Egyptian company 
loudly announced.48 What it was and where it went, however, is anyone’s 
guess, as it goes unmentioned in the 2012 Solidere annual report.49 However, 
the best bet is that it constituted a convenient land sale whose proceeds found 
their way into the fines, or rather fees, paid by SODIC to the Egyptian High 
Court for the criminal involvement in the Mubarak real estate scam.50 FYI 
fees given this context are a euphemism for fines paid by a wrongdoer without 
an admission of guilt.
By 2014, both lawsuits were resolved “amicably”. SODIC had extricated 
itself from its long-term payouts to Solidere and also terminated its property 
options with it. Meanwhile, the Lebanese company walked away from its 
corporate divorce with a dubious asset, an “unencumbered” 250,000 square 
meter parcel in Westown, approximately one-sixth of the development’s origi-
nal land complement.51
A few words need to be said about this land deal. By any measure, Solidere 
paid top dollar for the quarter of a square kilometer, the sixty-one acres 
that it purchased from SODIC somewhere in Sheikh Zayed City. By the 
author’s own calculations, SI forked out almost $205,000 for each acre of 
unimproved desert land that it purchased from SODIC, anything but a deal.52 
While nothing can beat the half piaster that the developers of Dreamland53 – 
the exclusive, gated pleasuredrome, built in the 1990s at the foot of the 
Pyramids – paid to the NCA, it seems that SI inexplicably splurged on idle 
and perhaps unsalable land which SODIC had previously “purchased” for a 
song under Mubarek. Even taking into account the punitive fees charged the 
Egyptian developer by the Egyptian High Court, the deal gives every appear-
ance of profiteering. In fact, it smacks of corrupt real estate business as usual. 
One thing that is for sure, though: Solidere itself has disclosed nothing about 
this transaction in its financial reports nor is it likely to do so in the foresee-
able future.
Squaring Up
A primary goal in 2001 of “A Matter of Life and Debt” was to reach at least 
a provisional understanding of how it was that Hariri’s nationalized plan-
ning agenda had borne scant economic fruit to date. Second, it sought to 
understand how it was that a planning proposal that prompted the destruc-
tion of the remaining downtown as precondition for its rebuilding would not 
have raised serious political doubts, or that its financing strategy of publicly 
subsidized privatization would not have met at least with the resistance of the 
country’s economists or financiers. How could it be that a country’s disbelief 
was apparently suspended in this case? These questions might eventually have 
been put to rest by Solidere’s successful financial performance. However, its 
returns to date have been anything but spectacular. In fact, Solidere A shares 
have dropped precipitously since their highs in 2008, while the corporation 
has continued to accrue significant levels of debt. By these two obvious 
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metrics alone, it would appear that Solidere is something less than completely 
healthy. And suffice it to say that the early questions as to the genesis of 
Solidere persist still.
After the recent literature review that has informed this reconsideration of 
“A Matter of Life and Death,” it seems obvious that Solidere has not retreated 
from the economic and political behaviors whose spatial formations were first 
observed more than a decade ago. What the recent research for this article 
has added to the original conclusions, however, is a more fungible set of 
understandings. Especially significant is the fact that for most Lebanese com-
mentators, Solidere presents an unfamiliar topography that exists surprisingly 
disconnected from their everyday lives. As peculiar as this may sound, it seems 
fair to say that today’s Solidere is a place where most Beirutis feel “othered.” 
There is good reason for their apprehension. Many regard it is a simultane-
ously exclusive and exclusionary space opportunistically contrived in the very 
image of those whom Solidere would most hope to attract here. It is a lure to 
wealthy foreign investors primarily, as it caters to their tastes, protects their 
interests, strokes their vanity, and keeps them safe from harm. Meanwhile, 
there are those who feel that Solidere is a place where the world works inside-
out, as locals commonly admit to feeling like unwanted interlopers unhabitu-
ated to, and discomfited by what was once an all-too-familiar locale. Finally, 
for yet another subset of Beirutis, Solidere remains haunted by the ghosts of a 
compelling, pre-war past, redolent of generations-long family contacts, shared 
experiences, sustaining livelihoods, and proprietary ties. A contrarian geogra-
phy, it harbors enduring collective memory that will not be evicted despite the 
company’s legal attempts, physical assaults, and land grabs to achieve this. 
The fact of the matter is that a great deal of this is pretty much how it seemed 
to be in 2001 and nothing learnt since has altered these original impressions. 
However, the previous understanding grew as further investigations were 
made into the expansion of Solidere-styled developments across the Middle 
East and the spread of its urban pathologies as the company “brand” is 
exported regionally. While rhetoric served up by these companies has the 
cloying smack of self-sacrificing public concern verging on the philanthropic, 
the truth of the matter is that public/private partnerships here serve to equip 
the private sector with the perceived, moral imperative and legal mechanics to 
seize public assets, while they actively undermine public interests, for example 
property rights. The capitalist enclaves that they produce are strictly intent 
on multiplying capital investment, on protecting the interests of its particular 
cadre of actors, and on making them richer. Meanwhile, those lacking the 
meaningful social and political connections, the “wasta” that is, stand to 
become even more marginalized. In Beirut, Amman, and Cairo, the trickle-
down effect from Solidere and its progeny is nil. In fact, the way things gener-
ally work here is “trickle up.”
In 1842, Edgar Allan Poe published a short story entitled “The Masque in 
the Red Death.” In it, a thousand courtiers, terrified by the plague afflicting 
the countryside, take refuge in the castle of feudal lord Prince Prospero. The 
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story is set against a masquerade ball held by the prince within an oppressive 
enfilade of color-coded reception rooms. In its last room, painted black, the 
Prince addresses a mysterious, cloaked attendee, unmasking him only to find 
himself confronting the plague itself. The Red Death, which he discovers cli-
mactically and too late, is one of the guests.
It has been difficult to watch YouTube footage of the January 2011 Tahrir 
Square demonstrations and not connect it to the photos of gated communities 
surrounding Cairo examined over the past few months. Egypt’s developers 
have tacitly connected to them as well, opportunistically using the country’s 
steeping social unrest as a way of marketing housing units in their gated com-
munities well out of harm’s way. Here, surrounded by golf courses, boutiques, 
cafes, swimming pools, running paths and bike trails, Cairo’s moneyed classes 
can while away the hours distracted from the nation’s political convulsions, 
riding out the plague in happy, “sustainable” sanctuaries on the perimeter. 
What the new suburbanites fail to appreciate, however, is the degree to which 
the cause of so much Egyptian social outrage is tied directly to economic and 
social entitlements from which paradoxically issue the endless “defilé” of new, 
luxury housing, as well as the pervasive climate of fear that, for many, is the 
precondition for such places’ very existence.
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terms and operations unencumbered by government oversight, in exchange for a 
combination of political support and filthy lucre. The story is recounted in Hazem 
Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt (London: Verso, 
2012): 99–113.
41 On May 15, 2015, the Egyptian High Court determined that time served would 
fill out the Mubaraks’ three- to four-year sentences and that fines paid to previous 
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Egypt Independent (May 2012), online edition, http://www.egyptindependent.com 
/news/sodic-sees-no-impact-ruling-against-ex-chairman-magdi-rasekh.
43 Mouhamed Wehbe, “Clash of the Titans: Solidere Breaks with SODIC,” Al-Akhbar, 
28 Sept 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12691, accessed August 2, 2016.
44 Zainab Fattah and Mahmoud Kassem, “Egypt’s Developers Pay the Price for Their 
Ties to Mubarak,” Bloomberg News, June 7, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/
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rather than as simple income with a tax rate of up to 39% for the wealthiest US 
earners. In the UK, the tax rate on such revenue is set at 10%. In Dubai, SI’s tax 
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to their business plans. And the UK constitutes the tax-home of at least a portion 
of Hariri assets. Rafiq Hariri’s town house on Hyde Park is currently listed at 
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46 Solidere’s Overdraft numbers more than doubled from FY2011 to FY2012, 
growing from $87.7 million to $177 million, a sure indicator of declining 
revenues.
47 By law, all new town developments must break ground within three years or risk 
being taken into government receivership. Given the number of stalled projects and 
empty land in Sixth of October, however, it is obvious to most that the government 
seldom if ever acts on this threat. Ibrahim Rizk Hegazy and Sedah Moustafa Wael, 
“Towards Revitalization of New Towns in Egypt Case Study: Sixth of October,” 
International Journal of Sustainable Built Environment II, no. 1 (June 2013): 10–18 
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overview even treated its readers to a first taste of “starchitect” Zaha Hadid’s 
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disclosure of SI’s covert business activities. Solidere Annual Report 2012 (Beirut: 
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suggesting that prices associated with land are tied to individuals involved in the 
secondary real estate market. At the time of the article’s writing, the vacancy 
rate in a number of Sixth October’s projects are at a whopping 50%. Hegazy 
and Wael, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212609013000125. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijsbe.2013.07.002
53 Dreamland constitutes perhaps the most notorious case of real estate fraud 
involving Egypt’s New Towns. Boasting a golf course, a Ritz Carlton hotel, 
the Mall of Arabia, an amusement park, and, most anomalous of all, a water 
park, this symbol of the country’s Mubarak–era conspicuous consumption was 
constructed by the country’s huge, diversified holding company Groupe Baghat. 
Pierre-Arnaud Barthel, “Repenser des ‘Ville Nouvelles’ du Caire: Défis pour 
Mettre Fin à un Développement Non Durable,” Egypte Monde Arabe: Open 
Edition III, no. 8, (2011): 188 n.7, http://ema.revues.org/2990?lang=en, accessed 
August 3, 2016.
24 ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY  Vol. 10 No. 1  September 2016
Amps
Bibliography
“An Amicable Settlement Concludes Solidere’s Dispute, SODIC.” Arab Finance, 
February 27, 2014. https://www.arabfinance.com/2015/Pages/news/newsdetails.
aspx?id=268690&lang=en&repcat=egngc, accessed August 3, 2016.
Anain, Tamer, and Laithy Mekawy. “New Homes and Developments: Buy 
Properties Directly from Top Class Developers: Allegria Sixth of October.” 
Real Estate Egypt. http://www.realestateegypt.com/Project/ProjectDesc.aspx? 
ProId=h+weyvfACrU=, accessed August 3, 2016.
Barthel, Pierre-Arnaud. “Repenser des ‘Villes Nouvelles’ du Caire: Défis pour Mettre 
Fin à un Développement Non-durable.” Egypte: Monde Arabe III, no. 8 (2011): 
181–207. 
Battah, Habib. “Erasing Memory in Downtown Beirut.” Beirut Report: Al Jazeera, 
January 19, 2014. http://www.beirutreport.com/2014/01/erasing-memory-in-
downtown-beirut.html, accessed August 3, 2016.
Becherer, Richard. “A Matter of Life and Debt: The Untold Costs of Rafiq Hariri’s 
New Beirut.” Journal of Architecture X, no.2 (February 2005): 1–41.
“C.R.E.A.M. – Cream Get the Money.” The Business Year Lebanon 2014. 
https://www.thebusinessyear.com/lebanon-2014/cream---cream-get-the-money/
focus.
Denis, Eric. “La Financiarisation du Foncier Observée à Partir des Métropoles 
Eqyptiennes et Indiennes.” Revue du Tiers Monde 2011/2, no. 206 (2011): 139–58. 
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RTM_206_0139.
Douaidy, Mounir. “Reconstruction of Beirut City Center: Solidere’s Experience.” 
Journalist Seminar in Amman, October 18, 2003: 1–6. http://www.kentelenileme/
dosyalar/dokuyab08.doc. 
Fattah, Zainab, and Mahmoud Kassem. “Egypt’s Developers Pay the Price for Their 
Ties to Mubarak,” Bloomberg News, June 7, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2011-06-06/mubarak-s-legacy-clouds-future-of-egypt-s-property-
boom-as-deals-unravel. 
”Finance – Solidere Goes Global: New Company to Register on DIFC.” Executive 
Magazine, July 1, 2007. http://www.executive-magazine.com/business-finance/
finance/finance-solidere-goes-global.
Hatherley, Owen, Oliver Wainwright, and Mike Herd. “Is Beirut’s Glitzy Downtown 
Redevelopment All It Seems?” The Guardian, January 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.
com/cities/2015/jan/22/beirut-lebanon-glitzy-downtown-redevelopment-gucci-prada. 
Hegazy, Ibrahim Rizk, and Sedah Moustafa Wael. “Towards Revitalization of 
New Towns in Egypt Case Study: Sixth of October, International Journal of 
Sustainable Built Environment II, no. 1 (June 2013): 10–18. http://ac.els-cdn. 
com/ S2212609013000125/1-s2.0-S2212609013000125-main.pdf?_tid=7d11b76c- 
d8dd-11e5-998a 00000aacb361&acdnat=1456088330 _d8509b038a28a28b2132b9f 
75a2b7f0d.
Irving, Sarah. “Lebanon’s Politics of Real Estate.” The Electronic Intifada: Electronic 
Lebanon (August 31, 2009). https://electronicintifada.net/content/lebanons-
politics-real-estate/8412, accessed August 2, 2016.
ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY  Vol. 10 No. 1  September 2016 25
Amps
Kandil, Hazem. Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt. London: 
Verso, 2012.
Lindsay, Ursula. “And Then Cairo Turned Itself Inside Out.” The National, March 4, 
2010. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/and-then-cairo-turned-itself- 
inside-out#page1.
Mango, Tamam. “The Impact of Real Estate Construction and Holding Companies: 
A Case Study of Beirut’s Solidere and Amman’s Abdali.” Ph.D diss., University 
of Exeter, 2014. 
Nash, Matt. “Exporting Solidere: The Hariri Jordanian Megaproject to Open after 
Years of Delay.” Executive Magazine, June 16, 2014. http://www.executive-magazine.
com/business-finance/real-estate/exporting-solidere-abdali-boulevard-amman.
Neal, Mark W., and Richard Tansey. “The Dynamics of Effective Corrupt Political 
Leadership in Lebanon: Lessons from the Hariri Political Career in Lebanon.” 
The Leadership Quarterly 21 (2010): 33–49.
“New Homes and Developments: Buy Properties Directly from Top Class Developers: 
Allegria Sixth of October.” Real Estate Egypt. http://www.realestateegypt.com/ 
Project/ProjectDesc.aspx?ProId=h+weyvfACrU=, accessed August 3, 2016.
Ohrstom, Lysandra. “Solidere: Vigilantism under Colour of Law.” Daily Star, June 8, 
2007. http://www.cggl.org/scripts/new.asp?id=862.
Piper, Karen. “Revolution of the Thirsty.” Places Journal (July 2012). https://
placesjournal.org/article/revolution-of-the-thirsty/, accessed August 4, 2016.
Rizk, Maysam. “Even the Future Movement is Disillusioned with Solidere.” Al-Akhbar, 
December 17, 2014. http://English.al-akhbar.com/node/22930, accessed 2 August, 
2016.
Shawkat, Yahi, and Kathy Gallagher. The World Bank and Egypt: The Impact of 
World Bank Policy and Programs on the Built Environment in Egypt. Washington, 
DC: World Bank Information Center (WBIC), 2013. https://consultations.
worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/bic._impact_of_wb_on_built_environment_in_
egypt_english.pdf.
Shenker, Jack. “Cairo Divided.” The Guardian (November 1, 2011). http://www.
jackshenker.net/egypt/cairo-divided.html.
“SODIC Sees No Impact from Ruling against Ex-Chairman Magdi Rasek.” 
Egypt Independent (April 3, 2012). http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/
sodic-sees-no-impact-ruling-against-ex-chairman-magdi-rasekh.
SODIC. “Forty West: Where it all comes together.” http://sodic.com/our-
developments/forty-west/, accessed August 4, 2016. 
Solidere. Solidere Annual Report 2008. Beirut: Solidere, 2008. http://www.solidere.
com/sites/default/files/attached/ar2008.pdf. 
Solidere. Solidere Annual Report 2012. Beirut: Solidere, 2012. http://www.solidere.
com/corporate/publications/annual-reports/solidere-annual-report-2012, accessed 
August 3, 2016.
Solidere. Solidere Biannual Report Jan–June 2013. Beirut: Solidere, 2013. http://www.
solidere.com/sites/default/files/attached/ba1-2013.pdf.
Solidere. [Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, auditors]. Independent Auditor’s 
Report: Lebanese Company for the Redevelopment and Reconstruction of Beirut 
26 ARCHITECTURE_MEDIA_POLITICS_SOCIETY  Vol. 10 No. 1  September 2016
Amps
Central District s.a.l. Beirut Lebanon. Beirut: Solidere, 2014. http://www.solidere.
com/sites/default/files/attached/ar2014.pdf.
“Solidere Egypt Files Claim against SODIC to Get Paid LE 237.5m.” Akhbarak, 
20 September 2012. http://www.akhbarak.net/articles/9618853-لاقملا-نم-ردصملا-
Solidere-Egypt-files-claim, accessed August 3, 2014.
United States Department of State. “Diplomacy in Action: 2012 Investment Climate 
Statement-Lebanon – Openness to and Restriction upon Foreign Investment,” 
June 2012. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191182.html. 
Wehbe, Mouhamed. “Clash of the Titans: Solidere Breaks with SODIC.” Al-Akhbar, 
28 Sept 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12691, accessed August 2, 2016.
Wehbe, Mouhamed. “Solidere ‘in the Red’: Real Estate Giant Exceeds Its Allowed 
Debt Ceiling.” Al-Akhbar, 7 July 2014. http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20470, 
accessed August 2, 2016.
Zabit, Jocelyne. “Beirut’s Legendary St. Georges Hotel Aims for a Comeback.” 
The Daily Star January 26, 2011. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-
News/2011/Jun-26/142190-beiruts-legendary-st-georges-hotel-aims-for-
comeback.ashx.
